Although industrial ecology represents a captivating metaphor and rich repertoire of analytical tools, its impact on environmental policy has been marginal at best. This article examines the insights provided by the studies of three common materials in the U.S. economy-lead, arsenic, and silver-and the ability of such studies to illuminate some larger and looming challenges for future environmental policy. Three specific challenges are explored: the flow of materials across national borders, the increasing embodiment of emissions in products, and the dangers of unchallenged assumptions about the drivers of material flows.
P O L I C Y P R E S C R I P T I O N S
In 1977 an insightful little book appeared called The Moon and the Ghetto (Nelson 1977) . On the surface, it presented a simple but irksome paradox. If we had the wherewithall and technological prowess to land a man on the moon, why couldn't we solve the problems of the ghetto? Twenty years later we have just witnessed a spectacular landing on Mars, not only well done, but done with a fair amount of ingenuity. Such feats still leave those of us facing a wide range of intractable terrestrial problems with a vague sense of inadequacy and impotence. If we can engineer our way to Mars, what about designing a path to a carbon-friendly future, better environmental monitoring systems, or a zero-emissions society?
The problem, both then and now, is often one of entrenched political power and an inability to cross ideological rifts that have little to do with science or substantive arguments. It is difficult to change public policy if the policymakers often lack the guts to do battle with vested interests. But another possibility is that we have been captured by intellectual traditions that can no longer adequately inform the public policymaking process. Although a consensus is emerging that the environmental problems we face are increasingly cross-scale in both space and time, there are few tools capable of allowing us to understand such systems and even fewer instances when these tools have been applied successfully to policy decisions. The analytical approaches we have used with good effect for the past 25 years, such as microeconomics and risk assessment, may not be the only ones needed to illuminate the environmental problems we will face as we move into the next millennium.
Given this background, industrial ecology represents an emerging whole-systems paradigm, but one that has received no serious consideration from the environmental policy community. Despite the attractiveness of the metaphor, the chances of industrial ecology remaining an interesting sidebar in the debates about the future of environmental policy remain high. The burden of proof will ultimately fall on members of the industrial ecology community. They face the problem of the new kid trying to get into the neighborhood soccer game. How do you prove yourself if you do not get to play?
They will have to show that the application of industrial ecology can illuminate new and valuable policy alternatives and clear criteria for their choice, point to institutional actors and define the roles they will have to play, and support the systemic search for environmental leverage points that would be missed or misinterpreted using the existing toolbox of analytical methods. In short, industrial ecology practitioners must show that things would be different, and better, if they joined the team and entered the policy game. This position is not much different from that faced for centuries by paradigm busters, naysayers, nonconformists, and alternative religions. In the 15th and 16th centuries attempts were often made to convert heretics and nonbelievers through the use of morality plays-allegories designed to confront viewers with ethical dilemmas and point to possible solutions. Here then are three short didactic pieces. The plots are well known to the industrial ecology community; their interpretation remains open to the policy critics. The titles are suggestive of the material lessons to be learned (as a U.S. policymaker, I draw primarily from American examples).
The Plays

Almost Closed (Lead)
The story of lead is an interesting one that has been well documented (Socolow and Thomas 1997) . A known neurotoxin, lead was the target of regulatory clampdowns in the United States which significantly reduced its dissipative uses in gasoline and paints in the 1970s. A dramatic decrease in blood lead levels in the general population followed. The dominant use remains in lead-acid batteries (1,180 metric tons 1 per year), and a significant amount of that demand is now met through recycling (estimates are between 93% and 98%). The infrastructure for recycling lead batteries in the United States is becoming more and more closed, and effective pollution control technologies have reduced the threats to populations living near secondary processors of lead.
The challenge of further reducing human health risks has now been shifted offshore to countries where battery reclamation and secondary processing is done in facilities that often do not meet high environmental or occupational health standards. A number of environmental groups have documented the horrific conditions under which these batteries are reprocessed in countries such as Indonesia, Taiwan, Thailand, and the Philippines, which imported 24,700 tons of lead-acid batteries in 1995 alone (IPS 1996) . The system boundaries are now global, and the policy debate has moved into the complex and often arcane world of international trade, treaties, and law.
Open Question (Arsenic)
Arsenic flows followed a very different path than did lead. Its use in the United States has remained relatively constant for the past 30 years at an average of about 20,000 metric tons annually (Loebenstein 1994) . As the dissipative uses of arsenic were curtailed by the development of substitutes and 1987 and 1993 EPA decisions to cancel inorganic arsenicals as nonwood pesticides and desiccants, the use migrated from agricultural applications into pressure-treated wood. The 5 billion board feet of pressure-treated wood produced each year contain chromated copper arsenate (CCA). This accounts for 90% of the worldwide arsenic demand and makes the United States the world's largest consumer of arsenic (two-thirds of global consumption in 1996).
The domestic production of arsenic in the United States ended completely in 1985 when ASARCO, the sole remaining producer, closed its smelter in Tacoma, Washington. U.S. demand is met entirely through imports mostly from China, the world's largest producer, and Chile, a growing provider. We now have a toxic that is trapped in wood products with a life span of 25-30 years that is used in virtually every new home in America, and no recycling or recovery strategy is in place to deal with the endgame. This wood can simply rot in place, be landfilled, or burned in EPA-approved and regulated incinerators, but keep in mind that the United States is producing and diffusing 15 cubic miles per year into every nook and cranny of the country.
Surprise (Silver)
The silver story began in San Francisco, where the Regional Water Quality Control Board discovered high levels of silver in the water, sediments, and tissues of fish and marine mammals in the bay. A mass balance study done by researchers at the University of California at Los Angeles found that one-half of the silver flowing through the U.S. economy, an amazing 2,000 tons, was being mobilized by dentists' offices and photo labs-essentially going down the drain in fixer solutions (Kimbrough et al. 1996) . The surprise was not only the discovery of a dissipative flow that had been missed, but that the service sector, long considered the environmentally benign partner in economic growth, was mobilizing the flows. There are 98,000 dentists' offices in the United States and thousands of photographic facilities, and 80% generate less than five gallons of silver-laden fixer per month. The traditional regulatory system is not set up to deal with such high numbers of scattered small generators; and it is equally difficult for these facilities to unravel the complexities of hazardouswaste regulation or justify the investment in recovery technologies for such small quantities. 3 Three ubiquitous and rather mundane materials: lead, arsenic, and silver. What can these stories tell policymakers? If Hegel was right about man learning nothing from history, then very little. But I think not. Taken collectively, they point to a future where intelligent environmental policy will increasingly depend on our ability to understand material leakages, substitutions, and shifts, and to understand these systemically across space and time. They clearly point to a world, well known in systems analysis, that exists on the other side of easy solutions to problems. A world where the main holes have been plugged and what remain are lower level, chronic problems that require continual vigilance and new datagathering techniques (Tanner 1996) . They also point to ongoing or upcoming policy debates where industrial ecology, an applied science,
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could test its applicability. A number of specific lessons and opportunities emerge.
The Lessons
The Flow of Materials across National Borders Will Be an Increasing Concern One issue illustrated by the lead case is the impact of transnational material leakage that may result in dumping of wastes or material reclamation in countries with weak environmental laws. In the case of arsenic, the issue is not just the flow of postconsumer wastes, but also the impact of one country's consumption and materials demand on primary extraction that has been moved offshore. A recent four-country comparative study of resource flows by the World Resources Institute showed that in smaller countries such as the Netherlands and Japan, a considerable amount of the material flows needed to support their economies takes place outside their borders (50% and 70% for these countries, respectively, versus 6% for the United States) (Adriaanse et al. 1997 ). Very few nations have systematically studied the impacts of transboundary material flows on a global scale, and no international organization exists where such endeavors have found a legitimate home. Cross-boundary flows also raise serious North-South equity issues.
But these are more than just interesting research topics. In 1998 countries from around the world will convene to discuss the Basal Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal (UNEP 1989). The convention has been ratified by 109 nations, including all members of the European Union but not the United States. Lacking any systemic way of accounting for material flows and fates at a global scale, the response so far has been a do-no-harm strategy which drastically curtails any trade in wastes. This position has been widely supported by environmental groups and many countries in the European Union. Whether that is also the noregrets strategy remains a question because the convention can define waste in ways that may ultimately preclude legitimate and efficient recycling. This is likely to occur with little or no understanding of the complex and unexamined trade-offs between recovering secondary materials and extracting virgin ore or a careful consideration of the long-term economic effects on metal and scrap recycling industries (about 40% of the copper and 29% of the zinc in India comes from secondary sources). If the global system of material and waste transfers is too complex to understand and police, then that may be the right policy response. Industrial ecology, however, provides an analytical framework for both understanding the flows of materials and potentially informing the decisions of the type underlying the convention.
Emissions Will Be Increasingly Embodied and Dissipated in Products
There is probably no faster and more effective way of dissipating a chemical than to put it into consumer products and let the market and the $43 billion a year advertising industry do their jobs. Greenpeace said it rather succinctly: All products are pollution. Maybe. Our experience with lead indicates that hazardous materials can be managed successfully. The arsenic story leaves one far less optimistic. Part of the problem is that for the past 25 years the United States has had an emissions policy, not a product policy. We do not have the data, information infrastructure, and analytical or regulatory tools to craft and pursue a product-oriented approach to environmental management. In addition, industry has serious reservations concerning the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (U.S. EPA) ability and mandate to do this.
This debate is at the core of deliberations over the future directions of the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI), considered by many to be the most successful information-based strategy implemented by the U.S. EPA. Presently the Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act of 1986 requires facilities that manufacture or process a listed toxic chemical to report on the environmental releases of those chemicals on an annual basis. Whether TRI can become a materials accounting framework remains in question (Bryson and Donohue 1996) . The U.S. EPA is pursuing TRI-Phase 3 legislation that would expand TRI reporting to look at
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chemicals brought on-site, consumed during production, and sent off-site as products. This would potentially overcome deficiencies of existing reporting which, in one documented case, allowed a company to report 8 pounds of arsenic emissions while sending 300,000 pounds of arsenic off-site in wood products heading for places unknown. Although it would provide a wealth of firm-level data, TRI-3 would still leave open the fate of materials that have entered commerce. Industrial ecology tools such as mass balance analysis, combined with hazard assessment techniques, could point to opportunities for risk reduction and more sustainable materials use in the larger material cycle and provide an analytical complement to TRI-based studies. This interface needs to be explored as do further ties to the management of wastes under the U.S. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA).
There Are Dangers in Unchallenged Assumptions, Especially about Drivers
Twenty-five years of environmental policy focused on end-of-pipe emissions produced by industry has resulted in assumptions about the nature and causes of environmental problems that are rarely challenged, either by the public or by policymakers. A recent Roper survey indicated that almost 50% of the public still do not understand that surface water runoff from cities, agriculture, roads, and highways, not waste from industry, is the primary cause of pollution to our streams, rivers, and oceans (Roper/Starch 1997) . The silver story caught people off guard and provides some evidence that the environmental impacts of the service sector can be significant, both as a cause and mobilizer of flows. Finally, the role of household consumption is poorly understood and rarely studied. A mass balance study done by the Swiss government for the city of St. Gallen found that an amazing 70% to 80% of all chemical flows through the local economy were being mobilized by household behaviorthousands of everyday choices concerning energy use and transportation, food purchases, cleaning, and waste disposal (Baccini et al. 1993) . Such findings are important. Any misunderstanding of the drivers mobilizing material flows can result in policy miscalculations or oversight, and, ultimately the application of the wrong tools to the wrong levers.
Maybe understanding the flows of materials in our economy is more challenging than going to Mars. I personally am not convinced. For a small amount of money (by federal standards), significant insights could be gained from industrial ecology, especially if these approaches were applied prospectively rather than just historically.
The outlines of the arsenic story were visible already in the early 1980s when the real estate and building boom began to drive the demand for pressure-treated wood up an exponential growth curve. Unfortunately, the people who were tracking these changes (such as the analysts at the U.S. Bureau of Mines) were completely segregated from environmental policymakers. At that time, a response could have been a combined industry-government research effort to develop and commercialize more environmentally benign preservatives-a road not taken. Looking forward, one can see a number of forks in the road for lead, many of them linked to decisions about energy storage in electric vehicles.
In many cases, we have the data and techniques needed to explore these issues. The problem may be more institutional than intellectual. Having spread the responsibilities for the material cycle across five or six federal agencies, assembling a holistic understanding or appropriate policies will be difficult even with the right information. A similar organizational chasm separates those dealing with today's problems from those concerned with tomorrow's. Ultimately, industrial ecology needs an institutional ecology to flourish.
Despite these hurdles, industrial ecology arrives on the scene at a propitious point in history. For the first time in two decades, we are having a serious debate about the future of environmental policy, both in this country and abroad. However, the industrial ecology community needs to engage the policy process and policy community headon. They need to understand that policymaking is highly opportunistic and often there are small windows of weeks or months when policies or rule makings will be opened and can be influenced. In lieu of total enlightenment, best-informed guesses, sub-optimization, or do-no-harm strategies prevail and often win. Industrial ecologists
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can inform these deliberations and debates. Or we can simply wait. In which case Max Planck was right when he observed that innovation rarely occurs through the conversion of its opponents, but only when the opponents gradually die out and a new generation is familiarized with the idea from the beginning.
Notes
The ideas contained in this article do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency or the U.S. government. 1. One metric ton equals 2204.6 pounds or about 1.1 short tons. 2. A recent summary of research on the impacts of wood preservative compounds concluded that despite decades of their use, "Relatively little research has been done to quantify or evaluate leaching of preservatives from treated wood after it has been placed in service" (Lebow 1993, 27) . More recent research done at the Connecticut Agricultural Experiment Station concluded that the acidity of aqueous solutions is a major factor in the leaching of arsenic from pressure treated wood and that "considerable amounts of Cu, Cr and As could leach from outdoor use of CCA treated wood since rainwater is acidic" (Stilwell and Gorny 1997, 27 ). 3. Cost-effective silver recycling is possible if certain economies of scale can be reached. The California Division of the health-care firm, Kaiser Permanente, operates such a facility in Berkeley, California. The system cost $210,000 to construct and roughly $70,000 in legal and consultant time to permit. The income from recovered silver flake from over 50 medical centers and clinics is approximately $240,000 per year, and $330,000, the cost of paying for the fixer to be recycled commercially, is saved (Interagency Workgroup on Industrial Ecology, Material, and Energy Flows 1997).
